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MARKET REACTION TO ACQUISITION 
ANNOUNCEMENTS AFTER THE 2008 STOCK 
MARKET CRASH 
Ozge Uygur, Rowan University 
Gulser Meric, Rowan University 
Ilhan Meric, Rider University 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Market reaction to mergers and acquisitions is a popular research topic in finance. It has been well 
documented in empirical literature that target companies earn significant abnormal market returns in 
corporate acquisitions. However, the effects of stock market crashes, and the effects of whether the acquirer 
is a domestic firm or a foreign firm, on target firm abnormal returns have not been studied sufficiently. In 
this paper, we make a contribution to the extant literature on these subjects by studying the abnormal 
market returns earned by U.S. target firms acquired by domestic and foreign firms after the 2008 stock 
market crash. Our test results indicate that U.S. targets that were acquired by other U.S. firms earned 
significantly higher abnormal returns, compared with targets acquired by foreign firms, after the crash. 
We also find that the target companies earned greater abnormal returns in non-friendly acquisitions than 
in friendly acquisitions during this period.     
 
JEL: G01; G34 
 
KEYWORDS: Financial Crisis, Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ergers and acquisitions (M&As) have been a popular research topic in finance. The notion 
becomes more appealing during the financial crisis times. For example, according to a New York 
Times article, M&A activity rose 23% in 2010 (Merced, et. al., 2011). Not just the number of 
M&A activities but also the characteristics of the crisis-time acquirers become interesting and need to be 
further evaluated. Literature provides preliminary explanations for mergers during financial crisis, for the 
cases of Asian and European cases (Baek, et. al. 2004; Mariana, 2013), however studies on US financial 
crisis intervals is left out.  
 
Regarding the US markets, it has been well documented in empirical literature that target companies earn 
significant abnormal market returns in corporate acquisitions. However, the effects of stock market crashes 
on target firm abnormal returns have not been studied sufficiently. In addition, literature lacks studies 
examining the effects of the type of the acquirer, i.e. the acquirer being a domestic or a foreign firm, on 
target firm abnormal returns. 
 
In this paper, we make a contribution to the extant literature on these subjects by studying the abnormal 
market returns earned by U.S. target firms acquired by domestic and foreign firms after the 2008 stock 
market crash. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Next section presents the literature review for the topic.  
Data and methodology is described in the following section. We present our empirical findings in the 
section titled “Results”. In the last section of the paper, we summarize our findings and conclusions. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
The synergistic benefits of mergers and market reaction to merger announcements have been studied 
extensively. The empirical literature documents evidence that the shareholders of target companies 
experience substantial gains after an acquisition. However, the shareholders of bidder companies generally 
experience either a small gain or a loss (Sudarsanam et al., 1996).  
 
The findings regarding bidder returns are inconsistent. For example, Jensen and Ruback (1983) find that 
bidding firm shareholders do not lose value in acquisitions. However, value destruction for acquiring firms 
has also been well-documented. These studies argue that the reason for the value loss could be various 
managerial actions such as hubris (Roll, 1986), managerial entrenchment (Morck et al., 1988; Jensen, 
1986), or wrong managerial decision-making (Morck et al., 1990). Some additional factors that may also 
influence the bidder value after an acquisition include the effect of the payment method (Martin, 1996; 
Harford, 1999), growth/investment opportunities (Lang et al., 1991; Martin, 1996), and past bidder 
performance (Morck et al., 1990). In addition, Akdogu (2007) suggests that bidders overpay due to 
competition during the bidding process. 
 
Cross-border mergers is another area in need of further research. Among the rare papers available, Starks 
and Wei (2013) provides evidence that bidder abnormal returns increase with the quality of the corporate 
governance of the bidder. Approaching the topic from another perspective, Becher, et. al. (2010) shed light 
to the merger gains in the very much neglected industry of utilities.  There are also many studies on how 
the target firms benefit from mergers. Overall, the consensus in the literature appears to be that the 
shareholders of target firms enjoy value increases (Dodd and Ruback, 1977; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). 
Dodd and Ruback, for example, provide empirical evidence that the stockholders of target firms can earn 
large positive abnormal returns regardless of the acquisition being successful or unsuccessful. Competition 
among bidders appears to increase target returns (Bradley et al, 1988) and targets with poor prior 
performance appear to benefit even more (Lang et al., 1989). The ownership structure also appears to have 
an impact on target returns. While more managerial ownership increases, more institutional ownership 
decreases, target gains (Stulz et al., 1990). Offenberg et. al. (2012) evaluates the effect of poor acquisition 
history of the targets on the premium received by that target. 
 
Although mergers and acquisitions are among the most extensively studied subjects in finance, the effects 
of stock market crashes on merger and acquisition activities have not been studied sufficiently. The market 
values of all companies fall sharply during stock market crashes. Therefore, many companies become 
attractive acquisition targets to both domestic and foreign buyers. Sherman and Badillo (2010) report that 
weak dollar and low company valuations made U.S. targets cheaper and encouraged foreign buyers after 
the 2008 stock market crash.  
 
The 2008 stock market crash was the worst stock market crash in U.S. history since the Great Depression. 
U.S. stocks lost 55 percent of their market value from October 9, 2007 to March 9, 2009. Our objective in 
this paper is to study the market reaction to domestic and foreign acquisitions of U.S. target firms after the 
October 9, 2007-March 9, 2009 stock market meltdown which lowered the market valuations of many U.S. 
firms drastically making them attractive acquisition targets for both domestic and foreign buyers. For 
comparison, we study three time periods of equal length: the pre-crash period (January 1, 2005-October 8, 
2007), the crash period (October 9, 2007-March 9, 2009), and the post-crash period (March 10, 2009-
December 31, 2011).  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Our data collection process consists of three steps. First, we identify the U.S. public firms acquired by 
domestic and foreign firms during the January 1, 2005–December 31, 2011 period. Secondly, we group the 
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target firms into three groups based on their merger announcement dates: Announcements between January 
1, 2005-October 8, 2007 are considered as pre-crash-period announcements, those between October 9, 
2007-March 9, 2009 are consider as crash-period announcements, and those between March 10, 2009-
December 31, 2011 are considered post-crash-period acquisitions. Lastly, we collect the balance sheet data 
from the COMPUSTAT database and the market data from the CRSP database for the target companies. 
Since the financial characteristics of financial firms differ from industrial firms, financial firms with a SIC 
code 6000-6999 are excluded from the study. 
 
The acquisitions data are extracted from the Capital IQ database. After identifying the U.S. public firms 
acquired by domestic and foreign firms during the January 1,2005-December 31, 2011 period, we obtained 
the financial data of these companies from their year-end financial statements in the COMPUSTAT 
database for the fiscal year one year prior to the year of the acquisition. In order to mitigate the influence 
of the outliers on the results, we winsorized the sample at the 1% and 99% levels. 
 
As the final step of our data collection process, we obtained the daily returns data of the target companies 
from the CRSP database. CRSP value-weighted index returns were used as a proxy for market returns (see: 
Servaes, 1991; Louis, 2005). To assess the impact surrounding the merger announcement date, the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated (see: Song and Walking, 2000).  We use the five-day 
period [-2,2] surrounding the announcement day as the event window in the calculation of the CARs (To 
check the robustness of the results, CARs over the three-day period around announcements [-1,1] was also 
used. In addition, we also calculated CARs by using log returns. The results were similar.) Our sample 
includes 132 U.S. target firms with no missing data over the study period. Eighty-seven of these companies 
were acquired by other U.S. firms and 45 were acquired by foreign firms. The break-down of the target 
firms, based on the acquisition announcement date, is presented in Table 1. The summary statistics for the 
target firms are presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 1: Sample Information 
 
 Before the Crash During the Crash After the Crash Full Sample 
 Targets acquired by  Domestic Firms 25 20 42 87 
 Targets acquired by  Foreign Firms 10 14 21 45 
 All Targets 35 34 63 132 
Table 1 displays the breakdown of the target firms, based on the acquisition announcement date and the type of the acquirer. It provides the number 
of target firms acquired by domestic acquirers and those acquired by foreign acquirers. Also for each group, the firms are classified as those with 
merger announcement date before, during or after the financial crisis. 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Targets Acquired by Domestic and Foreign Firms 
 
 Targets Acquired by Domestic Firms Targets Acquired by Foreign Firms 
  Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
  Total Assets 2,233.9 469.07 6,489.5 6,840.8 798.78 25,396 
  Current Assets 1,267.4 289.93 3.845.7 3,414.6 577.01 11,722 
  Net Fixed Assets  966.55 59.110 3,421.4 3,426.2 123.24 13,860 
  Sales 1,689.5 434.53 4,770.6 5,226.5 503.07 18,050 
  Net Income  133.59 12.780 580.54 298.44 23.501 1,029 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the target firms, while grouping those target firms based on the type of the acquirer. Mean, median and 
standard deviation figures are displayed for the target firms acquired by domestic firms and for those acquired by foreign firms. The main variables 
reported in the table are Total Assets, Sales and Net Income. Total Assets value is also broken down to Current Assets and Net Fixed Assets values. 
The values are in thousands of dollars. 
 
Our methodology is as follows. First, we examine the CARs at the univariate level, by comparing the mean 
values of the two groups and then testing the significance of the differences. Next, we use multivariate 
linear regression analysis to further examine the target company CARs by controlling for important factors 
such as firm characteristics, year effects and industry effects. 
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RESULTS 
 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the CARs of the target firms around the acquisition 
announcement dates. Panel A shows the CAR results for the three periods. Panel B shows the CAR results 
for the targets acquired by domestic and foreign buyers. 
 
The results in Panel A indicate that targets get a positive market reaction and receive an average of 12.5% 
positive abnormal return during the five-day event window around the announcement date. The returns 
appear to decrease during the crash period along with increased volatility in market reaction.  
 
The results in Panel B show that, in general, the targets acquired by domestic buyers receive more favorable 
market reaction compared with those acquired by foreign buyers. Both reactions are positive. On average, 
the targets acquired by domestic buyers receive an average of 14% abnormal positive return, while the 
targets acquired by foreign buyers receive an average of only 9% abnormal positive return. 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics for the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of the Target Firms 
 
Panel A: CARs for the Targets during the Three Time Periods 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. 10th Percentile 90th Percentile 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
 All Three Periods 0.1256 0.0909 0.1757 -0.0469 0.3469 
 Pre-Crash Period 0.1202 0.1173 0.1387 -0.0350 0.2747 
 Crash Period 0.1101 0.0534 0.2279 -0.0789 0.4322 
 Post-Crash Period 0.1370 0.0861 0.1635 -0.0264 0.3469 
Panel B: CARs for the Targets Acquired by Domestic and Foreign Buyers 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. 10th Percentile 90th Percentile 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs)  
 All Targets 0.1256 0.0909 0.1757 -0.0469 0.3469 
 Targets Acquired by Domestic Buyers 0.1436 0.1135 0.1705 -0.0350 0.4110 
 Targets Acquired by Foreign Buyers 0.0908 0.0593 0.1823 -0.0632 0.3158 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the target firms around the acquisition announcement dates. 
Panel A shows the CAR results for the three periods, pre-crash, crash, and post-crash periods. Panel B shows the CAR results for the target firms 
acquired by domestic and foreign buyers. Mean, median, standard deviation, 10th and 90th percentile values of the CARs are displayed for the 
relevant group of firms. 
 
Next, we conduct a mean difference test for the CARs of the targets acquired by domestic buyers vs. those 
acquired by foreign buyers. The results are presented in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: CARs Mean Difference Test: Targets Acquired by Domestic Buyers vs. Targets Acquired by 
Foreign Buyers 
 
 Mean Values 
Variables Targets Acquired by 
Domestic Buyers 
Targets Acquired by 
Foreign Buyers 
Difference t value 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
 All Three Periods 0.1436 0.0908 0.0528   1.65 * 
 Pre-Crash Period 0.1019 0.1661 -0.0640  -1.25  
 Crash Period 0.1521 0.0500 0.1021   1.30  
 Post-Crash Period 0.1645 0.0822 0.0823 1.92 ** 
Table 4 reports the mean differences of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the target firms acquired by domestic buyers and those acquired 
by foreign buyers. T statistics and the relevant significance levels are reported at the last column. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1%  levels, respectively.  
 
The results indicate that, in general, the targets acquired by domestic buyers earned significantly higher 
CARs compared with those acquired by foreign buyers. The difference is significant at the 5-percent level 
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for the post-crash period and at the 10-percent level for all three periods. The mean CARs of the targets 
acquired by foreign buyers is higher compared with that of the targets acquired by domestic buyers in the 
pre-crash period. However, the difference is not statistically significant. 
 
We use multivariate linear regression analysis to further examine the effect of the time period, and whether 
the buyer is a domestic firm or a foreign firm, on target company CARs. The regression model used in the 
analysis is as follows:  
            (1) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵) + 𝛼𝛼2(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵)+ 𝛼𝛼3(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵) + 𝛼𝛼4(𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷) + 𝛼𝛼5(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)+ 𝛼𝛼6(𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷) + �𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼) + �𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗(𝐵𝐵𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼) + 𝜀𝜀 
 
CARs = Cumulative Abnormal Returns [-2,2] of target companies, 
the dependent variable in the regressions.  
DOMESTIC BUYER DUMMY = 1 if the buyer is a domestic firm, 0 otherwise. 
CASH ACQUISITION DUMMY = 1 if the target was paid cash, 0 otherwise. 
FRIENDLY ACQUISITION DUMMY = 1 if the acquisition was friendly, 0 otherwise. 
FIRM SIZE = Natural log of total assets. 
DEBT RATIO = Total debt divided by total assets. 
PERFORMANCE = Return on Assets: Net income divided by total assets. 
 
To assess the impact of the acquisition announcement on target returns, following Song and Walking 
(2000), the CAR variable is calculated as the cumulative abnormal returns over the five-day period [-2,2] 
surrounding the acquisition date. In order to capture the impact of the type of the buyer, we use a 
DOMESTIC BUYER DUMMY variable that equals 1 if the buyer is a domestic firm and zero otherwise.  
 
Previous studies suggest that acquisition announcements tend to result in higher positive CARs for targets 
in cash mergers (see: Martin, 1996). To capture this effect, we use a CASH ACQUISITION DUMMY 
variable in our regressions that equals 1 if the target company is paid in cash and zero otherwise. Previous 
studies also suggest that acquisition announcements tend to result in higher positive CARs for targets in 
friendly mergers (see: Morck et al., 1988). To capture this effect, we use a FRIENDLY ACQUISITION 
DUMMY variable in our regressions that equals 1 if the acquisition is friendly and zero otherwise.  
 
Our model also includes three additional control variables representing key firm characteristics that have 
been used in previous merger studies: FIRM SIZE (see: Servaes, 1991), the natural log of total assets, DEBT 
RATIO (see: Bruner, 1988), total debt divided by total assets, and PERFORMANCE (see: Lang et al., 1989), 
the return-on-assets ratio. 
 
The regression results are presented in Table 5. The results with the full sample are presented in the first 
column of the table. The results for the three time periods are presented in the next three columns.  
 
The regression coefficient of the DOMESTIC BUYER DUMMY has a positive sign and it is statistically 
significant at the 10-percent level for the post-crash period. This result indicates that the U.S. target firms 
that were acquired by domestic firms earned significantly higher abnormal returns, compared with those 
that were acquired by foreign firms, in the post-crash period.  
 
The regression coefficient of the FRIENDLY ACQUISITION DUMMY has a negative sign and it is 
statistically significant at the 5-percent level for the post-crash period. This result indicates that U.S. target 
firms earned significantly higher abnormal returns in non-friendly acquisitions than in friendly acquisitions 
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the post-crash period. The regression coefficient of the dummy variable is also statistically significant at 
the 10-percent level with a negative sign for the full sample.  
 
Table 5: Multivariate Linear Regression Analysis 
 
 Dependent Variable = Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of the Targets 
Explanatory 
Variables 
All Acquisitions Acquisitions Before 
the Crash 
Acquisitions  
During the Crash 
Acquisitions  
After the Crash 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.2789 
(1.79) 
* 0.2623 
(1.14) 
 0.1812 
(0.58) 
   0.1080 
(0.54) 
 
Domestic Buyer Dummy 0.0490 
`(1.38) 
 -0.0383 
(-0.52) 
 0.0168 
(0.16) 
 0.0810 
(1.77) 
* 
Cash Acquisition Dummy 0.0619 
(1.34) 
 0.0050 
(0.06) 
 0.1254 
(0.75) 
 0.0690 
(1.17) 
 
Friendly Acquisition Dummy -0.0762 
(-1.78) 
* -0.0583 
(-0.82) 
 0.0128 
(0.11) 
  -0.1375 
(-2.25) 
** 
Firm Size -0.0018 
(-0.14) 
 0.0073 
(0.26) 
 -0.0182 
(-0.45) 
 -0.0047 
(-0.29) 
 
Debt Ratio 0.0436 
(0.47) 
 0.0642 
(0.41) 
 -0.1927 
(-0.74) 
 0.0939 
(0.72) 
 
Performance 0.1930 
(1.41) 
 0.1543 
(0.78) 
 0.6016 
(0.99) 
 0.2371 
(1.24) 
 
Dummies for years yes yes yes     yes 
Dummies for industries yes yes yes     yes 
   
Adjusted R2 0.0252  0.1624  0.1788  0.2327  
F Value  0.80  0.57  0.54  1.14  
Sample Size 132  35  34  63  
Table 5 presents the regression analysis results with cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as the dependent variable. The model used for the 
regression is as follows: 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵) + 𝛼𝛼2(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵) +
𝛼𝛼3(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵) + 𝛼𝛼4(𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷) + 𝛼𝛼5(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) + 𝛼𝛼6(𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷) + ∑𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼) +
∑𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗(𝐵𝐵𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼) + 𝜀𝜀. Coefficient estimates are displayed and the relevant t statistics are given in parenthesis underneath. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
The regression coefficients for the CASH ACQUISITION DUMMY, FIRM SIZE, DEBT RATIO, and 
PERFORMANCE variables are not statistically significant for the total sample and for none of the three 
periods. These results indicate that these variables were not significant determinants of abnormal target 
returns during the period studied.  
 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
Market reaction to corporate acquisitions is a popular research topic in finance. It has been well documented 
in the empirical literature that the stockholders of target companies earn positive abnormal market returns 
in corporate acquisitions. However, the effects of stock market crashes on corporate acquisitions have not 
been studied sufficiently.  
 
The 2008 stock market crash is the worst stock market crash in U.S. history since the Great Depression. 
U.S. stock prices fall by 55 percent from October 2007 to March 2009. The lower market valuations of U.S. 
companies after the crash made them attractive acquisition targets for both domestic and foreign buyers. In 
this paper, we study the market reaction to acquisition announcements after the 2008 stock market crash 
with the event-study methodology.  
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Our findings indicate that, in the post-2008 crash period, the stockholders of U.S. target firms earned 
significantly higher abnormal market returns if the acquirer was a domestic firm compared with a foreign 
buyer. We also find that the abnormal market returns earned by the stockholders of U.S. target firms were 
significantly higher in non-friendly acquisitions than in friendly acquisition during this period.  
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